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I

ABORIGINAL SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty and aspects of its defeasance, acknowledgement, assertion or

recovery comprise a series of topics, which are encountered in an ever-decreasing sphere
of coincidence. No meaningful discussion of any of these topics can begin without first
surveying the history of the preceding topic. As such, it is a tournament of privileges,
which will result in the discovery of complicated theories and deliberate obfuscation to
curtail indigenous rights of self-governance and title. Even in the confirmation of these
unique powers and apparent efforts to be forthright on the part of the colonizing nation
these privileges are tainted by limitations and impediments.
Sovereignty is best discussed in a known context, rather than as a vague concept.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sovereignty” as:
The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any
independent state is governed; supreme political authority; the supreme
will; paramount control of the constitution and frame of government and
its administration; the self-sufficient source of political power, from which
all specific political powers are derived; the international independence of
a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs
without foreign dictation; also a political society, or state, which is
sovereign and independent.1
This paper will review the comparative state of sovereignty of indigenous peoples
in the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. In each country, different areas
of the Black’s definition will fall to the wayside. The evidence presented will reveal that
in no single country do indigenous people enjoy the full spectrum of sovereignty’s
absolute, independent, uncontrollable authority over internal, political and governmental
institutions. That said, the vast differences that remain at the heart of the subject expose a
disparity that is extraordinary in its scope and compelling in its nature.
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Sovereignty is approached from different directions, which reflect the priorities
of the society in which the conflict is raised. In some countries, the sovereignty
arguments arise from the fight for indigenous title to land and in others it is a function of
the fight for the right of self-governance. The approach most consistent with Black’s
definition is that of the right to self-governance.2 This is an assertion of theory based
upon the reality that once title is established the fight for self-governance begins anew,
albeit, with the distinct advantage of both possession and ownership defined by the
political system of the colonial nation with which the aboriginal people are in conflict.
Where relevant, reference will be made to the source of the sovereignty. It is key
to the understanding of this issue to clearly perceive whether the source of the sovereign
power is inherent and, as such, preceded colonization, or whether the source is derivative
and, as such, was delegated from the colonizing authority. The theory to be presented
here is that when it is adjudged inherent, it is far less likely to be limited, impeded or
rescinded.
II

UNITED STATES
The case of initial impression in the United States court system to discuss and

determine issues of Native American sovereignty was Johnson v. M’Intosh3, decided in
1823. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, made three determinative
statements in his opinion that seemed to set the stage for a limited and vague right of
sovereignty. First, Chief Justice Marshall said, “…their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished”4. He further explained, “While
different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted

William D. Wallace

3

the ultimate dominion to be in themselves” and concluded, “The history of America,
from its discovery to the present day, proves, we think, the universal recognition of these
principles.”5 Without saying so explicitly, Chief Justice Marshall was arguing a limited
recognition of the Doctrine of Discovery.6 He made strenuous rational arguments that the
entire property ownership system that had grown from the initial royal grants of title
would be upset by a complete recognition of a sovereign Native American title and
property right in fee simple.7 He equivocated in his statement about England that, “[H]er
claim of all of the lands to the Pacific ocean, because she had discovered the country
washed by the Atlantic, might, without derogating from the principle recognized by all,
be deemed extravagant.”8 In doing so, Chief Justice Marshall recognized the legal fiction
involved in his decision but nevertheless acknowledged the political and legal necessity
to establish such a theory.
The political reality of a limited Native American sovereignty was further defined
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, decided in 1831.9 Chief Justice Marshall stated
unequivocally that, “The acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as
a state, and the courts are bound by those acts.”10 Full sovereignty was being advocated
by counsel for the Cherokee Nation but was defeated in favor of a new argument,
denying them the rights of a “foreign nation” as considered in Article III of the United
States Constitution and instead, expressed as:
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent
nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of
possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.11
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In doing so, Chief Justice Marshall created a new political entity, the domestic
dependent nation, and a variety of sovereignty that had yet to be seen on the world stage
and for which limits clearly existed, even if they were undefined.
Cherokee Nation was followed a year later by another case, Worcester v.
Georgia12, which established that the laws of the State of Georgia had no effect on the
lands of the Cherokee Nation.13 The rationale was beautifully expressed but short lived.
The Chief Justice stated:
The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people
distinct from others." The constitution, by declaring treaties already made,
as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted
and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and
consequently admits their rank among those powers that are capable of
making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our own
language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by
ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have
applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of
the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.14
The Worcester decision seemed to recognize and create a status very similar to
that of a foreign nation wholly contained within the boundaries of another and if taken in
conjunction with the Cherokee Nation decision, would have created the broadest sense of
sovereignty possible in the full context of nations. However, fifty-six years later a case
was presented that completely turned this theory upside down.
A murder case came to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
California.15 In the case, two Indians were charged with the murder of another Indian on
the Hoopa Valley Reservation.16 If Worcester were to be taken on its face then the
defendants would be liable only under the laws of the tribe and only within the tribal
system of justice. However, in an opinion clearly influenced by the Indian Wars which
had occurred subsequent to the United States Civil War, the United States Supreme Court
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found that, “Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they [Indians]
are found are often their deadliest enemies.”17 Based upon that consideration the court
determined that:
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of
dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it
has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by
Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.18
This rationale provides the basis for a policy of preemption, codified in the Indian
Appropriations Act19, and asserts the authority of the federal government to prosecute
crimes on Indian reservations.
The combination of the Cherokee Nation case and the Kagama case provides the
legal authority for the teeth of Congress’ Plenary Power Doctrine. The Plenary Power
Doctrine originated with the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3,
which states that Congress shall have the power, “To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”20. The addition of
these cases to the “Indian Commerce Clause” creates the stage from which Congress may
preempt the sovereignty of Native American tribes.
Sovereignty was limited, but not completely discarded. The treaties previously
reached with Native American tribes were still binding law in most parts. The United
States Supreme Court seized upon the opportunity in Winans21 to remind the legal
community that a Treaty was an instrument that granted rights to the federal government
from the Indian Tribe and not vice versa, a notion that recognizes an inherent, rather than
a derivative sovereignty.22 However, this reverence for the inherent theory of sovereignty
shifted in 1934, when the federal government attempted to reorganize the governmental
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processes of the Native American tribes into structures, which included constitutions and
representative bodies and generally were more in keeping with a perceived democratic
process.23 This legislation, The Indian Reorganization Act24, not an impediment to selfgovernment and was not mandatory, but rather, was an encouragement and authorization
to restructure their government processes as well as a derivative form of sovereignty.25
This set the stage for a case, which cleared the air about the source of sovereignty
for Native Americans. In Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe26 the issue at bar was whether
the Oglala had a right to levy taxes.27 The court found that the Oglala had the right to
levy taxes and that right was completely in keeping with its sovereignty.28 Judge Vogel
specifically indicated the source and limitations of Native American sovereignty in his
opinion when he referred to Kagama:
…the Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court, acknowledges the
paramount authority of the United States with regard to Indian tribes but
recognizes the existence of Indian tribes as quasi sovereign entities
possessing all the inherent rights of sovereignty excepting where
restrictions have been placed thereon by the United States itself.29
Iron Crow reflected the prevailing opinion of Native American sovereignty until 1978,
when the United States Supreme Court asserted an important restriction in Oliphant v.
Susquamish Indian Tribe.30
Oliphant held that pursuant to treaty and Congressional action the Susquamish
Indian Tribe did not have the right to prosecute non-Indians.31 The court continued with
its examination of this limitation upon the sovereign powers of the tribe and determined
that, “Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative
delegation of such power by Congress.”32 Sovereignty as regards civil matters was
confronted in Montana v. United States33. In Montana the court found that an Indian
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Tribe may exercise civil authority over non-Indians when the matter at hand affected the
tribe’s political, economic, health or welfare interests.34 Exercise of sovereignty over
non-tribal members came up again in 1990 in Duro v. Reina35. The United States
Supreme Court determined in Duro that an Indian tribe did not have criminal jurisdiction
over an Indian who was not a member of their tribe.36
Criminal trial and punishment is so serious an intrusion on personal liberty
that its exercise over non-Indian citizens was a power necessarily
surrendered by the tribes in their submission to the overriding sovereignty
of the United States. … As full citizens, Indians share in the territorial and
political sovereignty of the United States. The retained sovereignty of the
tribe is but a recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain
over Indians who consent to be tribal members. Indians like all other
citizens share allegiance to the overriding sovereign, the United States. A
tribe's additional authority comes from the consent of its members, and so
in the criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal authority.37
As such, Justice Kennedy articulated a civil liberties argument to defeat an
assertion of sovereignty by Native Americans upon a class of people with whom they
similarly were situated.38 The response to this decision was a quick exercise of
congressional plenary power to override the Duro decision and restore authority to Indian
tribes to assert criminal jurisdiction over all Indians, without a requirement of
membership in the offended tribe.39 Specifically, the statute defined self-governance as:
''powers of self-government'' means and includes all governmental powers
possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all
offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed,
including courts of Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of
Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians;40
The series of cases which form the modern scope of United States Native
American sovereignty regarding civil disputes begins with Williams v. Lee41. In Williams
a unanimous United States Supreme Court reiterated that states have no power to regulate
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the concerns of Indians on their reservations unless an act of Congress specifically
delegated the power on an particular issue.42 Additionally, it endorsed the exercise of
civil jurisdiction over suits against Indians by non-Indians for controversies arising in
Indian country.43 Montana v. United States44 was the next influential sovereignty and
civil disputes case. Decided in 1981, Montana held that Indian tribes have jurisdiction
over issues and controversies which affect their interests, including those brought by nonIndians.45 The third case providing significant direction in Tribal authority over civil
controversies involving non-Indians was decided in 1997.46 Strate v. A-1 Contractors47
was also a unanimous decision, albeit one that would limit tribal sovereignty.48 The court
decided that tribes may not assert jurisdiction over a dispute between two non-Indians
that occurs on reservation land that is owned in fee by a non-Indian entity.49 In this case
the land was a stretch of highway.50 The decision provides some instructive dicta, which
briefly recaps the matter of tribal sovereignty over criminal and civil matters:51
Tribal-court jurisdiction over non-Indians in criminal cases is categorically
restricted under Oliphant, we observed, while in civil matters "the
existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a careful
examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has
been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of
relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and
elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions."52
The court quoted directly from National Farmers v. Crow Tribe53 in their recap
and left little doubt that Native American sovereign power to decide such matters exists
in a limited fashion.54
III

CANADA
Any discussion of the sovereignty concerns of First Nations in Canada must begin

with reference to British rule and the Royal Proclamation of 1763.55 The Indian
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Provisions section of the Act began with a tremendous flourish of respect for the First
Nations stating, “[T]he several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are
connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed”.56
However, the same flourish ended with a presumption of dominion over the First
Nations’ lands by indicating that those lands were in fact, “Parts of Our Dominions and
Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us”.57 Additionally, the
document outlawed the purchase, taking or possession of land without the express written
permission of the Crown and specifically forbade the Royal Governor to issue that
permission.58 The Proclamation assumes and asserts dominion59 not unlike the Doctrine
of Discovery endorsed in Johnson v. M’Intosh.60
Law Professor Bradford Morse of the University of Ottawa described the
development of issues surrounding sovereignty in Canada as having taken two distinct,
consecutive paths prior to the modern era.61 Professor Morse cited the Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples in stating: “Treaty-making was initially the primary vehicle for
determining the relationship between the Crown and First Nations. The treaty process
was not, however, extended throughout all of Canada, and treaties were rarely fully
honored by the Crown.”62 Professor Morse subsequently explained that the process
shifted from that of treaty making with indigenous people to one of assimilation.63 The
effect on sovereignty being that “the authority and functions of traditional Aboriginal
governments were significantly eroded.”64
As such, the search by Inuit, Metis and Indian First Nations of Canada for
a sovereign right of self-government is a precarious path through treaties and their
specific effect in light of the Proclamation of 1763,65 the Constitution,66 and the Indian
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Act.67 Two specific portions of the Constitution and the Indian Act are particularly
relevant to the discussion of sovereignty. The first portion of the Constitution at issue is
section 25, as revised in 1982, which states, in relevant part:
25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not
be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or
other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada
including
a. any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal
Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and
b. any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements
or may be so acquired.68
The second portion of the Constitution at issue is section 35, as revised in 1982, which
states, in relevant part:
35. 1. The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2). In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit
and Métis peoples of Canada.
(3). For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights" includes rights
that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.
(4). Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and
treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male
and female persons.69
The portion of the Indian Act at issue is section 81, which reads, in relevant part:
“81. (1) The council of a band may make by-laws not inconsistent with this Act or
with
any regulation made by the Governor in Council or the Minister,
for any or all of
the following purposes…”70
by-

There follows a lengthy but not exhaustive list of justifications for the assertion of

laws and sovereign jurisdiction of matters of concern to First Nations.71
The relevant portion of the Constitution appears on its face to import the
protections alluded to in the Proclamation in their full force and effect, which makes the
question of their intended effect even more relevant. The Indian Act appears on its face to
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operate like a codified version of Montana v. United States72 providing for the power to
exercise authority in areas of concern to the tribe.73 Inevitably, these issues were
examined at close quarters with relevant and contested treaty language and the Supreme
Court of Canada issued instructive interpretation.
In 1985, the case of Guerin v. The Queen74 reached three helpful conclusions. The
first discussion was a reiteration of the fiduciary duty of the Crown as codified in the
confirmation of the Indian Act:75 Through the confirmation in s. 18(1) of the Indian Act
of the Crown's historic responsibility to protect the interests of the Indians in transactions
with third parties, Parliament has conferred upon the Crown a discretion to decide for
itself where the Indians' best interests lie.76
Where by statute, by agreement or perhaps by unilateral undertaking, one
party has an obligation to act for the benefit of another, and that obligation
carries with it a discretionary power, the party thus empowered becomes a
fiduciary. Equity will then supervise the relationship by holding him to the
fiduciary's strict standard of conduct.77
Thus, the government of Canada, by expressing a sovereign interest in the
protection of its aboriginal population incurs an obligation that mirrors the diminution of
indigenous sovereignty.
The second instructive discussion in Guerin provides a structure to the fiduciary
relationship and indicates that the obligation is based upon the assertion of the Discovery
Doctrine principle that aboriginal title was alienable only to the Crown.78
The fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Indians has its roots
in the concept of aboriginal, native or Indian title. The fact that Indian
Bands have a certain interest in lands does not, however, in itself give rise
to a fiduciary relationship between the Indians and the Crown. The
conclusion that the Crown is a fiduciary depends upon the further
proposition that the Indian interest in the land is inalienable except upon
surrender to the Crown.79
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The determination that the predicate condition to a fiduciary relationship is the
assumption of sovereign control over the alienability of indigenous title in 1763 seems to
indicate very clearly that the spirit of that agreement colors the current law and
limitations on self-government.
The third instructive portion of Guerin is the clarifying statement, “Indian title is
an independent legal right which, although recognized by the Royal Proclamation of
1763, nonetheless predates it.”80 This statement is both a recognition of the inherent
sovereignty of the aboriginal titleholders and an admission that the aboriginal title was
changed forever by the arrival of Crown authority.81
In the process of delicately extracting clear frameworks of aboriginal sovereignty
from the context of treaties and the formative Acts listed here Regina v. Sioui82 lends very
helpful analysis. The first helpful indication in Sioui is the recognition that the initial
interaction of the Crown with the First Nations of Canada considered and assumed a
certain amount of sovereignty in the ownership of land and self-government of the
Tribes.83 In relevant part the opinion states:
The British Crown recognized that the Indians had certain ownership
rights over their land, it sought to establish trade with them which would
rise above the level of exploitation and give them a fair return. It also
allowed them autonomy in their internal affairs, intervening in this area as
little as possible.84
The second and very relevant legal determination in the Sioui opinion was the
recognition that treaties between the Crown and indigenous peoples were not the
formalistic European documents that the Crown had encountered elsewhere but were to
be taken in the context in which they were made and, in that context, were equally
binding.85 The specific text of the opinion stated.
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The colonial powers recognized that the Indians had the capacity to sign
treaties directly with the European nations occupying North American
territory. The sui generis situation in which the Indians were placed had
forced the European mother countries to acknowledge that they had
sufficient autonomy for the valid creation of solemn agreements which
were called "treaties", regardless of the strict meaning given to that word
then and now by international law.86
The Supreme Court of Canada found reason to recognize both inherent and
derivative sovereign interests of the indigenous peoples of Canada in their recognition of
the premises expressed in the Proclamation and the relevant treaties negotiated and
signed since that time. Evidence of this is offered in Guerin and Sioui.
The recognition of certain sovereign interests for First Nations did not have a
blanket application. The Supreme Court delineated the context in which rights would be
recognized in two further cases. The first relevant case is that of Regina v. Pamajewon.87
In Pamajewon Justice Osborne attaches a Tribe specific consideration in the
determination of self-government.88 Specifically, he states:
Any broad inherent right to self-government held by the appellants was
extinguished by the British assertion of sovereignty. The success of a
claim to any more specific right of self-government will depend on the
historical evidence regarding the aboriginal community of the particular
claimant.89
In so doing, Justice Osborne relates that the experience, custom, and preserved
treaty rights of each First Nation is different and derived from its individual experience.90
Justice Osborne turned to another 1996 Supreme Court of Canada case for the test
to determine the specific self-government rights of individual first nations.91 The test he
turned to was articulated in Van der Peet v. The Queen92 and it required a showing of two
elements, a custom/tradition element and an integral/distinctive-to-the-culture element.93
The opinion specifically stated:
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[T]he following test should be used to identify whether an applicant has
established an aboriginal right protected by s. 35(1): in order to be an
aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or
tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming
the
right.94
As such, the recognition of a presupposed right of self-government by a First
Nation will require a showing that the particular activity was a custom or tradition.
Further, that it is integral or distinctive to the culture of that First Nation, and if it
conflicts with Canadian law that was preserved by treaty commensurate to the conditions
set forth in this test.
In Regina v. Gardner,95 the court summarized the essence of this set of criteria
and indicated that the standards used in determining the criteria are neither static nor
restricted to a particular point in time, but rather evolve based on the custom of the
tribe.96 Quoting Van der Peet:
The characterization of aboriginal rights should refer to the rationale of the
doctrine of aboriginal rights, i.e., the historic occupation and use of
ancestral lands by the natives. Accordingly, aboriginal practices, traditions
and customs would be recognized and affirmed under s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 if they are sufficiently significant and fundamental
to the culture and social organization of a particular group of aboriginal
people. Furthermore, the period of time relevant to the assessment of
aboriginal activities should not involve a specific date, such as British
sovereignty, which would crystallize aboriginal's distinctive culture in
time. Rather, as aboriginal practices, traditions and customs change and
evolve, they will be protected in s. 35(1) provided that they have formed
an integral part of the distinctive aboriginal culture for a substantial
continuous period of time.97
As such, consideration of the limits of any single First Nation’s sovereignty,
notwithstanding sovereignty derived from political advantage in any given political
subdivision,98 is derived of this method of review.
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The case that determined the Nisga Nation’s sovereignty disposition is an
example of this process at work.99 In Campbell v. British Colombia, the British
Columbia Supreme Court considered a challenge to the Nisga Nation’s treaty purporting
to settle their sovereign rights.100 The outcome is instructive as the application of the
process designed by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Campbell Court noted that the
preamble to the Constitution establishes an expectation that “gaps” in sovereignty will
occur and may be resolved.101
British imperial policy, reflected in the instructions given to colonial
authorities in North America prior to Confederation, recognized a
continued form, albeit diminished, of aboriginal self-government after the
assertion of sovereignty by the Crown. This imperial policy, through the
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, assists in filling out "gaps in the
express terms of the constitutional scheme."102
The plaintiff challenged the treaty, asserting that it “violate[d] the Constitution because
parts of it purport[ed] to bestow upon the governing body of the Nisga’a Nation
legislative jurisdiction[,]” thus failing to comply with the Constitution’s division of
powers.103 The court, however, disagreed, 104 declaring:
the assertion of Crown sovereignty and the ability of the Crown to
legislate in relation to lands held by Aboriginal groups does not lead to the
conclusion that powers of self-government held by those Aboriginal
groups were eliminated. Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the
principles underlying aboriginal rights set out in paragraph 95 above, first
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall and later affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in cases like Sioui.105
Thus, the court upheld the Nisga’a Nation’s right to limited independent legislative
authority, subject to federal or provincial constraints.106 As such, the circuitous route set
out by the history of Canadian jurisprudence, regarding the sovereignty of its First
Nations and the determination of the powers of self-government to which they are
inherently and derivatively entitled, appears to have worked in favor of the Nisga Nation.
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III

NEW ZEALAND
Historical development of the sovereignty of indigenous peoples in New Zealand

began prior to the Treaty of Waitangi107 with the Declaration of Independence,108 signed
by thirty-five Maori Chiefs on October 28, 1835.109 In the Declaration, the Maori Chiefs
used a uniquely “Western” document to assert a sovereignty not previously memorialized
in a written instrument.110 The translated document expressly both proclaims the Chiefs’
authority for executive and legislative power and anticipates the possibility of future
alienation of that power.111 Specifically, the document states, in part:
2. All sovereign power and authority within the territories of the United
Tribes of New Zealand is hereby declared to reside entirely and
exclusively in the hereditary chiefs and heads of tribes in their collective
capacity, who also declare that they will not permit any legislative
authority separate from themselves in their collective capacity to exist, nor
any function of government to be exercised within the said territories,
unless by persons appointed by them, and acting under the authority of
laws regularly enacted by them in Congress assembled.112
The document specifically stated in its text that a copy of the Declaration was to be
transmitted to the King of England with thanks for His Majesty’s recognition of the
Maori flag.113
Four and a half years later, on February 6, 1840, the Crown negotiated the Treaty
of Waitangi with the Maori Chiefs, thereby alienating the sovereignty of the Maori
people.114 Article I of the Treaty ceded, without reservation, complete sovereignty to the
British Crown on behalf of the Maori Chiefs, irrespective of whether or not the Chiefs
were a part of the ruling Confederation of United Tribes.115 The text of the Treaty
appeared on its face to be without any qualification or equivocation:116
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The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and
the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the
Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and
without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the
said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess,
or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective
Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.117
The second article of the Treaty set forth the Crown’s assurances in return for ceding
sovereignty.118 In addition to recognition as loyal British subjects, the indigenous
peoples of New Zealand were to receive “full exclusive and undisturbed possession of
their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries [sic] and other properties which they may
collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same
in their possession.”119 The caveat was that “the Chiefs of the United Tribes and the
individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption over such lands
as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate,”120 such that an indefeasible right
to purchase land of aboriginal title accrued to the Crown, not unlike the discovery
doctrine relied on by the courts in the United States and Canada.
The apparent effect of these two articles, when taken in tandem, is that the
indigenous peoples of New Zealand have absolutely no claim to any sovereign right of
self-determination because that right was ceded in full from the original possessors to the
Crown of England. However, that contention is not without challenge. In 1987, the
Wellington Court of Appeal resolved a sovereignty claim raised in New Zealand Maori
Council v. Attorney-General121 with a determination of law based on two theories.122 As
regards the North Island of New Zealand, the court found the Treaty of Waitangi to be
legitimate, binding and dispositive.123 With regard to the South Island, the court found
sovereign title in the Crown by virtue of discovery.124 In conclusion, the court found that
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“[t]hese proclamations were approved in London and published in the London Gazette of
2 October 1840. The sovereignty of the Crown was then beyond dispute and the
subsequent legislative history of New Zealand clearly evidences that Sovereignty in New
Zealand resides in Parliament.”125 With that, the Wellington Court of Appeal foreclosed
any claim of indigenous sovereignty.
New Zealand legal scholars acknowledge that the matter may be closed for now
but offer theories as to a possible resurrection of Maori sovereignty.126 Ani Mikaere and
Stephanie Milroy of the University of Waikato point out that challenges by Maori to the
sovereignty of the Crown were increasing as of the year 2000 and that, at least in part, the
surge was due to an increase in awareness of inconsistencies between the Maori and
English texts of the Treaty.127 These scholars concluded that “[g]iven the increasing
attention being paid to both the Maori text of the Treaty of Waitangi and the Declaration
of Independence, as well as the growth in Maori cynicism at the Crown's claim to
sovereignty, further challenges of this sort are inevitable.”128
Three years later, Professor Paul Rishworth of the University of Auckland
expanded on the work of Ms. Mikaere and Ms. Milroy.129 Professor Rishworth argued
that two concurrent, confounding factors cause confusion, giving rise to discontent and
challenges to the Treaty of Waitangi and its transfer of sovereignty.130 The first factor is
that, as a document of legal importance, the Treaty is simply too short to give much
direction or clarity to the confusion.131 The second factor, acknowledged by Ms. Mikaere
and Ms. Milroy, is that “it is in Maori and English versions, neither of which are direct
translations of each other.”132 He explains, “[i]n its English version the Treaty might be
thought a fairly straightforward exchange, albeit momentous: Maori sovereignty is ceded
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to the Crown in exchange for promises that Maori property rights will be protected and
that Maori will be treated equally as British subjects.”133
The Maori text of the Treaty of Waitangi differs in more that just tone and choice
of prose.134 Indeed, the Maori text ceded something very different from what the Crown
purported to have received.135 Professor Rishworth points out that most of the Maori
signed the Maori version of the Treaty and thus assented to very different terms:136
[i]n Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the Chiefs cede only governorship while
retaining chieftainship over their possessions, tangible and intangible. This
is well capable of meaning, as we know, that Maori were promised a
continuing chiefly authority over their own affairs, divorced from property
ownership (but that, as well, where it is retained).137
Although the courts have determined the question of sovereignty in keeping with New
Zealand Maori Council, Rishworth observes the curious political reality of devolution, in
which the Crown has devolved itself of certain interests in Maori institutions.138 He
states that “[r]econciling [the Crown’s cession of authority in specific areas of Maori
governance] with the Crown's claim to an absolute sovereignty, in which Maori are
subjects, is a challenge.”139
Finally, Professor Rishworth concludes that the practical result is somewhat
different than the controversy would lead one to believe. He argues that the:
outcome in the courts at least is that the Treaty is seen to generate principles that
are essentially "process" oriented: that the Crown must deal fairly and in good
faith with Maori tribes, with consultation and so on. A process conception of the
Treaty sits relatively comfortably within the human rights paradigm.140
Notwithstanding the professor’s affection for the political solution, the weight of the legal
authority appears to be riding against him, especially in the context of the well-settled
Wellington Court of Appeal decision that sovereignty is and has been decided for one
hundred sixty years.141
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IV

AUSTRALIA
Australia also began as an English Colony. As with the United States, Canada

and New Zealand, the question of aboriginal sovereignty arose before Australia came into
being as a nation. A patchwork of authority regarding aboriginal sovereignty rights has
developed in absence of any formal treaty between the governments of England or
Australia and the aboriginal peoples of Australia. The patchwork includes case law and
legislation that alternately recognize, run from, obscure or reflect a measure of autonomy
to be memorialized or obfuscated as convention or convenience dictate. The authority
shows that the power of self-governance and self-determination is laid upon principles
that are various and far-flung without a clear federal mandate to guide them.
The Australian courts historically recognized an aboriginal system of justice, as
addressed by the court in Regina v. Ballard.142 In that case, both the murder defendant
and the murder victim were Australian aborigines.143 When the accused appeared before
the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the Chief Justice relied upon the existence and
reliability of a native system of justice to administer the matter.144 The decision was
predicated upon the court’s aversion to becoming the duty-bound venue to resolve not
just criminal but also property disputes between aboriginal residents.145 It is in this
dismissive manner, probably motivated by a need to be expeditious, that the court
inadvertently recognized a small piece of sovereign self-governance by the
acknowledgement of an aboriginal system of justice.
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The nexus of any discussion of modern notions of aboriginal sovereignty in
Australia begins with the Proclamation delivered by Governor Bourke on October 10,
1835.146 Governor Bourke articulated the legal principle of “terra nullius”147 or literally
translated, “no earth.”148 The Proclamation created the legal fiction that no title in fee
existed with any person prior to that date.149 The effect of this pronouncement was to
create, where it had not existed in fact, an opportunity for the Crown to claim title in fee
to all of Australia based upon the discovery doctrine. As such, the discovery doctrine has
played a role in defeasing aboriginal title in the United States, Canada, New Zealand and
Australia.
By 1835, no title in fee existed in any aboriginal resident of Australia, except that
which might come to him through the Crown. However, the Crown had taken notice of
her native inhabitants and pursued a direction very similar to that which it had used in the
United States, Canada, and New Zealand; it declared itself the fiduciary caretaker of its
native ward. Passage of the Aboriginal Protection Act150 in 1869 established a
caretaker/ward relationship between the government of Victoria and the aboriginal
peoples living within the state.151
Subsequently, in 1900, England passed the Australian Constitution and
established definite Crown authority over the indigenous peoples of Australia.152
Authority was established through a simple, but passive, manner. Chapter One, section
fifty-one, of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act specifically enumerated
the powers of Parliament.153 The section expressly declined to enumerate powers relating
to Australian people of the aboriginal race.154 Because the states are seized of the powers
not specifically enumerated to the Parliament, and because the principle of “terra
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nullius”155 divested the aboriginal people of any preexisting title or right to selfgovernance, it followed that the state legislatures became immediately seized of the right
to legislate all matters concerning the interests of the indigenous population.
In essence, the states had already begun to exercise this power by enacting
Aboriginal Protection Acts similar to the one enacted in Victoria.156 The rationale behind
such acts for Australia was similar to the motives of the United States, Canada or New
Zealand, in which a fiduciary relationship arose from the defeasance and divestiture of
aboriginal rights that created a ward and guardian relationship.157
The condition of this patchwork, piecemeal, state-by-state approach to indigenous
sovereignty, or lack thereof, changed in 1972 when Australia signed the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.158 The Covenant articulated
principles that were adverse to the history and experience of the aboriginal and Australian
peoples. Specifically, Article I of the Covenant made two bold statements, which, if
taken in context, foretold great changes on the horizon for sovereignty concerns of the
aboriginal people. Article I, Clause 1 of the Covenant stated that “[a]ll peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”159
Furthermore, Article 1, Clause 3 of the Covenant bound the government of Australia to
recognize the rights of its indigenous peoples.160 The relevant clause states that “[t]he
States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization
of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”161
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On March 10, 1976, the effective date of the Covenant, the context in which
aboriginal people lived within Australia began to shift. In that year, two important pieces
of domestic legislation were enacted which began the process of recognizing and acting
upon the sovereignty and self-government of Australia’s native people.162 First was the
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act.163 It was designed to provide a structure for
the varied native tribes by providing “for the Constitution of Aboriginal Councils and the
Incorporation of Associations of Aboriginals and for matters connected therewith.”164
The second act of the same year, in keeping with the Covenant, helped to begin
the process of determining an equitable solution to disputes over land. 165 The Aboriginal
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act provided, among other things, “for the granting of
Traditional Aboriginal Land in the Northern Territory for the benefit of Aboriginals.”166
As the framework began to fit together to grant aboriginal people a larger role in
land ownership and self-government, challenges were inevitable. The first bold claim
asserted by the aboriginal people was a claim to sovereignty over the entire continent of
Australia on the premise that the royal claim was void.167 Coe v. Commonwealth of
Australia168 reached the High Court of Australia three years after the Covenant took
effect. The aboriginal plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that “Captain James Cook
RN….wrongfully proclaimed sovereignty and dominion over the east cost of the
continent now known as Australia for and on behalf of King George III” in April of
1770.169 Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that “Captain Arthur Phillip, RN. wrongfully
claimed possession and occupation for the said King George III … that area of land
extending from Cape York to the southern coast of Tasmania and embracing all the land

William D. Wallace

24

inland from the Pacific Ocean to the west as far as the 135th longitude” in January of
1788.170
The plaintiff took on Governor Bourke’s determination of “terra nullius”171
directly with the argument that:
7A. The whole of the said continent now known as Australia was held by
the said aboriginal nation from time immemorial for the use and benefit of
all members of the said nation and particular proprietory (sic) possessory
and usufructuary rights in no way derogated from the sovereignty of the
said aboriginal nation.
8A. (also 21A) The proclamations by Captain James Cook, Captain Arthur
Phillip and others and the settlement which followed the said
proclamations and each of them wrongfully treated the continent now
known as Australia as terra nullius whereas it was occupied by the
sovereign aboriginal nation as set out in paragraphs 5A, 6A and 7A
hereof.172
The plaintiff’s position was nothing less than a complete departure from the conventional
understanding sovereignty and title, and the court was simply unwilling to make such a
change. The court first disposed of the sovereignty issue:173 “[t]hus what I have called
the first branch of the proposed statement of claim cannot be allowed because generally it
is formulated as a claim based on a sovereignty adverse to the Crown.”174 The court
declined to dismiss the issue of title with such haste: “[t]his declaration may not be in the
precise form which would or could be granted but a statement of claim will not be struck
out because the declarations and other relief sought are defective.”175 The court thus
sought to incorporate the new direction of the law in this area, as laid out in the Covenant
and the subsequent acts protecting aboriginal interests. In so doing, the Coe court
foreshadowed an inevitable showdown, realized in Mabo v. Queensland.176
The High Court of Australia first addressed the facts of Mabo in 1988, when it
considered an aboriginal claim of title that dated to a point prior to “discovery” of
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Australia by Captains Cook and Phillip.177 The facts of Mabo were tailor made to give
instruction and direction on this new legal horizon. Essentially, the aboriginal Torres
Strait Islanders had occupied their remote portion of Australia, primarily unfettered by
Crown rule, until the Crown asserted a sovereign interest in the land.178 When challenged
by the aboriginal claimants, the Crown passed a declaratory act affirming that it
effectively had established sovereignty over a century earlier and extinguishing any other
native rights.179 The court in Mabo I declined to determine what, if any, aboriginal rights
had actually survived the Crown’s initial annexation of the territory in 1879, instead
focusing exclusively on the validity of the declaratory act.180 The court instead ruled that
the declaratory act’s impermissible effect was to discriminatorily deny rights to ethnic
aboriginal Australians in violation of pre-existing antidiscrimination legislation.181
A mere four years after the court ruled in favor of Mabo I, the parties were once
again before the court to litigate their aboriginal rights to land.182 In the final round,
Mabo II, the plaintiff picked up the argument where the court had left it, claiming that
native title, if not extinguished by the Australian government through the 1985
declaratory act, must still exist.183 The two most important and dispositive findings made
by the court were, first, that the title was never effectively extinguished by the Crown
and, second, that the land has been continuously held from some date prior to the
discovery by Captains Cook and Phillip.184 The opinion states, in relevant part, that:
the common law of this country recognises [sic] a form of native title
which, in the cases where it has not been extinguished, reflects the
entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants, in accordance with their laws or
customs, to their traditional lands and that, subject to the effect of some
particular Crown leases, the land entitlement of the Murray Islanders in
accordance with their laws or customs is preserved, as native title, under
the law of Queensland.185
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The holding of Mabo II represents the culmination of small steps of policy change, which
led to the judicial recognition of a legal concept, native title, that had been denied by the
declaration of “terra nullius”186 some 157 years prior.
The Australian Aborigines thus had judicial support to challenge Crown title in
favor of native title, and the Wiradjuri Tribe’s case was primed to test the limitations of
Mabo II.187 In Coe v. Australia,188 the plaintiff argued several theories of why and how
Australia should cede title to land in New South Wales that already had been granted in
fee to subsequent owners.189 The Coe plaintiffs advanced arguments predicated upon
their right to self-government pursuant to development following the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights190 and the Mabo I cause for alienation
without compensation inconsistent with anti-discrimination legislation. Mabo II asserted,
and Coe argued, that the origin of native title preceded discovery by the British Crown, as
well as advancing arguments of breach of fiduciary duty, inter alia.191 However, the
court found no merit in some of the plaintiff’s claims and focused on the item which was
central to all of the causes of action plead, “[c]ertainly the sovereignty claim is the central
element in the case pleaded in the statement of claim.”192 The court went on to
distinguish this case from Mabo II:193
5. Furthermore, within the lands claimed there are many areas of land
which have been dealt with by statutes and are the subject of freehold and
other grants of title. Hence, the plaintiff is asserting a claim to many
parcels of land in New South Wales which are the subject of grants of
freehold and other title. That is a matter of particular relevance to the
plaintiff's assertion of native title in accordance with the decision in Mabo
v. Queensland (No.2).194
As such, Coe v. Australia provides an instructive look at the limitations the court is
willing to set in the new Post-Mabo regime.
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Australia’s experience is unique in that is the single country that steadfastly
refused to enter into a formal treaty with its indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, it
acknowledged and affected change as a result of a changing outward perspective toward
the world stage rather than an inward focus on property rights. Although the question of
formal sovereignty is somewhat difficult to answer, the legislative actions of Australia
and her many states in areas that affect aboriginal title and rights clearly reveal that the
only remaining way in which they have been excluded is as a direct party to the
legislation that has controlled and defeased so much of their prior inherent rights.

V

CONCLUSIONS
This survey of cases, legislation, declarations and treaties encompasses four

nations and approximately 240 years. The situations have stark differences and striking
similarities. All four nations and their policies regarding indigenous persons were heavily
influenced by England. Each of the cases surveyed was either operative, illustrative or
instructive regarding the limitations on the indigenous rights to self-governance and title
to land. Each nation incorporated some variety of a discovery doctrine, ward/guardian
doctrine and preemption doctrine. With the exception of Australia each nation had an era
of treaty making with the indigenous peoples. With the exception of New Zealand, each
nation exercised some sort of assumption that original and remaining aboriginal
sovereignty was inferior to that of the Crown. Additionally, it appears from the
experiences of the indigenous peoples of the United States, Canada, New Zealand and
Australia that sovereignty which is asserted and preserved as inherent and preceding the
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influence of England may be preserved in some way. However, those rights to selfgovernance and title, which are derived of a treaty or legislative act are less durable and
more likely to be subsequently limited and curtailed. Finally, none of the indigenous
peoples in any of the four countries listed above enjoys complete sovereignty. Those
privileges vary based upon the context in which the actors find themselves; on
reservation land, off reservation land, on reservation land held in fee simple by an
indigenous person, or by a non-indigenous person. Finally, even in Australia where no
treaty was ever offered to the aboriginal people, external forces, such as multilateral
treaties on human rights, are having a net positive influence on the need and articulation
of the sovereign rights of indigenous peoples.
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